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Deep Disagreements on Social and Political
Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and
the Need for a New Research Perspective
Abstract: This article starts off with a historical section showing that deep disa-
greements among notions of social and political justice are a characteristic fea-
ture of the history of political thought. Since no agreement or consensus on dis-
tributive justice is possible, the article argues that political philosophers should
– instead of continuously proposing new normative theories of justice – focus on
analyzing the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of disagree-
ments. The next two sections are analytical. The first sketches five possible rea-
sons for deep disagreements among notions of social and political justice. The
second discusses the meta-ethical relevance of the lack of consensus on justice
and rejects ethical realism and cognitivism based on the argument from deep dis-
agreements.
1 The need for a new research perspective
on social and political justice
Following Neo-Kantians like Jürgen Habermas and in particular John Rawls,
leading contemporary political philosophers aim at some form of consensus or
rational agreement on justice.¹ Rawls conceives of this as a consensus concern-
For their astute and helpful comments on this article I thank Thomas Schramme, Stephen Snyd-
er, Andreas Urs Sommer, and Bertjan Wolthuis.
 Nussbaum understands her capabilities approach as “a partial theory of social justice” that
“aspires to be the object of an Overlapping Consensus” (2011, pp. 40, 93, cf. pp. 79, 91). In
line with Ronald Dworkin, Will Kymlicka even claims that all contemporary theories of justice
agree on “equality as a value” (2002, p. 4; cf. Haus in this volume). In several of his writings,
Jürgen Habermas holds that unimpeded discourses and arguments based on communicative rea-
son are generally able to solve disagreements and lead to consensus in moral issues (1991; cf.
Wolthuis in this volume). Like discourse, consensus is a central value of modern proponents
of deliberative democracy who believe that deliberations ideally aim at rational agreement. In
response to this, Jeremy Waldron states “that in the real world, even after deliberation, people
will continue to disagree in good faith about the common good, and about the issues of policy,
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ing an “initial choice situation” for principles of justice, as a rational agreement
on which principles to choose, or as an “overlapping consensus” that a pluralist
society should reach with regard to a political conception of justice (1971, § 4,
§§ 20 ff.; pp. 18, 118 ff.; 2005, IV §§ 1–8, pp. 133– 172). For Rawls, citizens’ consen-
sus on principles of justice is an essential feature of a “well-ordered society”
(1971, § 1, p. 4 f.; 2005, I § 6, p. 35). However, the notion that a consensus on so-
cial and political justice could be achieved was questionable from the start. This
was made evident by Robert Nozick’s immediate and strong disagreement with
Rawls’s fundamental moral conviction that the inequalities of natural endow-
ments are undeserved and call for social redress or compensation (Nozick
1974, pp. 168 f., 225, 228). Likewise, no agreement can be reached about Rawls’s
claim that individuals are equal as moral persons (Rawls 1971, pp. 19, 505). Going
back to Aristotle, John Kekes argued that people who habitually harm others
have a lower moral worth than those who habitually do good (Kekes 1990,
pp. 121– 123). From this perspective, Rawls’s rationalist creed that all persons
can be convinced by the same arguments and must therefore reach a rational
consensus on principles of justice becomes highly questionable (Rawls 1971,
p. 139).
This article argues for the need of a shift of the research perspective on social
and political justice. Its first aim is to show that no consensus on justice is pos-
sible. The article demonstrates that many convictions and conceptions concern-
ing social and political justice are not only opposed to each other, but that there
exist deep disagreements between them. Deep disagreements are disagreements
that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments (cf. Fogelin
2005, pp. 8, 11).² As a consequence of deep disagreements on social and political
justice, political philosophers should redirect their efforts. Instead of continu-
ously proposing and defending new normative theories of justice, they ought
rather research the reasons, significance, and consequences of such kinds of dis-
agreements and find out how to cope with them. In order to progress, innovative
political thought has to move beyond the idea of the consensus. This move is
also necessary because many political conflicts are caused by or can be derived
from disagreements on social and political justice that can – in the worst cases –
lead to violent conflicts and even civil wars.³
principle, justice, and right which we expect a legislature to deliberate upon” (1999, p. 93, cf.
p. 91 f.).
 Fogelin’s 1985 article sparked controversies on deep and peer disagreements. For a summary
of the debates and literature on the epistemology of disagreement see Siegel 2013.
 The arguments of this article proceed mainly on the conceptual level. However, this level is
closely linked to the level of “practical politics”. Philosophical conceptions of social and polit-
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Insights regarding deep disagreements on social and political justice can be
found, as early as 1984, in Dagmar Herwig’s systematic study on justice – her
“Habilitationsschrift” – that received little attention (Herwig 1984). Herwig’s
study shows that two opposing models of justice – “equal treatment” (Gleichbe-
handlung) and “equalization” (Egalisierung) – can be traced throughout the his-
tory of political thought.⁴ In Justice and Interpretation (1993), Gorgia Warnke
questioned the “ideal of political consensus” from the perspective of the “herme-
neutic or interpretative turn” in political philosophy and argued that there are
“disagreements between equally well-justified interpretations” (Warnke 1993,
p. VIIf.).⁵ Also Stuart Hampshire’s Justice is Conflict and Jeremy Waldron’s Law
and Disagreement depart from disagreements on justice and the divergent con-
ceptions of justice prevailing in society (Hampshire 1999; Waldron 1999). Wal-
dron laments that contemporary philosophers are contributing mainly to exist-
ing disagreements concerning justice, of which there are many, instead of
pondering their significance: “it is rare to find a philosopher attempting to
come to terms with disagreements about justice within the framework of his
own political theory” (Waldron 1999, p. 1 f.).
For Hampshire, all “modern societies are, to a greater or lesser degree, mo-
rally mixed, with rival conceptions of justice, conservative and radical, flaring
into open conflict and needing arbitration” (Hampshire 1999, p. 38). These
kinds of conflicts about “substantial justice” cannot be overcome but are not
a defect. Harmony and consensus are, according to Hampshire, unrealistic
goals. The best we can hope for are institutions and procedures that realize “pro-
cedural justice” and a fair “adjudication of conflicts” (Hampshire 1999, pp. 29,
45). Procedural justice is usually “imperfect and not ideal”, leading to compro-
mise and not to consensus (Hampshire 1999, pp. 39, 42–43). Hampshire requires
from all “moral enemies” to follow the principle “that contrary views of what is
ical justice usually depart from “practical” social and political issues and attempt to think
through such issues “theoretically” or defend a specific conception of justice. However, it is
not only philosophers, but also “ordinary” citizens, who have a sense of justice and conceptions
of social and political justice that motivate their political actions. Sometimes citizen’s concep-
tions of justice are informed by philosophical theory and theorists usually hope to influence
“practical politics”.
 For a critical account of Herwig’s view see Steinvorth in this volume.
 One of the political theorists with whomWarnke substantiates her supposition of a hermeneu-
tic turn is Michael Walzer and his claim that all social goods should be distributed according to
their “social meanings” or citizen’s “common understanding” of these goods (Walzer 1983,
pp. XIV, 8– 12, 312 f.). From Warnke’s perspective, there is disagreement on justice because
meanings of social goods must be understood or interpreted and there are many different and
justifiable ways to do this.
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just and fair are allowed equal hearing, equal access, in the city or state, and that
no one conception of substantial justice in society is imposed by domination and
by the threat of force” (Hampshire 1999, pp. 46, 29–46).⁶
In section 2 (2.1–2.3) this article lays out several of the insurmountable dis-
agreements on just distributions and a just society. This section will demonstrate
that from the ancient world to the present day two fundamentally opposed basic
conceptions of social and political justice can be traced in Western political
thought. In modern terminology, these two irreconcilable conceptions can be
characterized as egalitarian and non-egalitarian notions of social and political
justice. While champions of egalitarian justice negate the natural and social in-
equalities of people and hold that it is just to establish arithmetic, numeric or
simple equality, non-egalitarians or proportionalists like Plato, Aristotle or
Nietzsche conceive of a just distribution of goods as proportional to existing in-
equalities. For non-egalitarians or champions of proportional justice, it is just to
allot equal shares only to equals, not to everyone. The historical sketches in sec-
tion 2 allow for a more detailed comprehension of the various aspects of the ir-
reconcilable pluralism and conflict within conceptions of justice. Based on this
understanding, section 3 sketches five possible reasons for deep disagreements
among notions of social and political justice. This is intended as a first and pre-
liminary step towards a better understanding of deep disagreements on justice.
Section 4 briefly discusses the meta-ethical relevance of these irreconcilable dis-
agreements. The section argues that statements about a just distribution or a just
society do not refer to objective moral facts like ethical realists hold and cannot
claim objective moral truth like cognitivists assert. As a consequence of the irrec-
oncilable pluralism and conflict within conceptions of justice,we have to adopt a
form of ethical relativism or skepticism that could be called “ethico-political rel-
ativism” or “ethico-political skepticism”.
 For Hampshire’s case for procedural justice see Giorgini in this volume.
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2 From ancient to contemporary philosophy:
The irreconcilable pluralism and conflict of
conceptions of social and political justice
2.1 Egalitarian versus proportional justice in Plato and
Aristotle
Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings contain valuable insights regarding opposing
conceptions of distributive justice and the corresponding political systems that
can be derived from them. The views of these ancient philosophers on political
justice have played a vital role in shaping Western political thought. Their influ-
ence can still be traced in the irreconcilable conceptions of social and political
justice found in contemporary philosophy. Going back to the Pythagoreans, in
the Gorgias and the Laws Plato distinguishes between two concepts of equality.
One kind of equality he calls equality of “measures, weights and numbers”, the
other one the “most genuine” and “best” equality (Leg. VI 757b; Plato 1997,
p. 1433). Both forms of equality are inextricably linked to distributive justice,
which Plato understands as political justice. Since Aristotle, the first form of
equality is called “arithmetic” or “numeric” equality. In modern democracies
this form of equality is realized and manifested in the principle “one citizen,
one vote”. Michael Walzer calls this form of equality “simple equality”.⁷ For
Plato, legislators implement this form of equality when they “distribute equal
awards by lot” (Leg. VI 757b; Plato 1997, p. 1433; cf. Leg. III 690c). This was the
way in which most political offices were distributed in ancient democracies.
As an aristocratic political thinker who defends the rule of the morally and in-
tellectually best men, Plato rejects the democratic and egalitarian claim that a
distribution of political power should allot equal shares to all male citizens
(cf. Knoll 2017a).
The second form of equality is distinguished by Plato as a divine form of
equality (Leg.VI 757b). In the Gorgias, Plato calls this form of equality “geomet-
rical equality” (508a, cf. 490b–e). Geometrical equality is proportional equality.
In order to politically apply it one needs
to grant much to the great and less to the less great, adjusting what you give to take account
of the real nature of each – specifically, to confer high recognition on great virtue, but when
 “Simple equality is a simple distributive condition, so that if I have fourteen hats and you
have fourteen hats, we are equal” (Walzer 1983, p. 18).
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you come to the poorly educated in this respect, to treat them as they deserve.We maintain,
in fact, that statesmanship consists of essentially this – strict justice (Leg. VI 757c; Plato
1997, p. 1433).
In this crucial and condensed passage Plato presents his theory of proportional
justice, which is a political theory of distributive justice. It contains most of the
building blocks of Aristotle’s theory of distributive justice and in particular of
the conception of political justice he prefers, which is an aristocratic conception
focusing on political virtue (cf. Knoll 2010; Knoll 2017b). As the context of the
passage elucidates, by addressing the distribution of recognition Plato a fortiori
addresses the distribution of political offices and power. For him, such distribu-
tion should proceed according to proportional equality. Before political power is
distributed, citizens need to be distinguished according to the criteria “virtue”
(arête) and “education” (paideia) (cf. Aristotle: Pol. III 13, 1283a25; all trans.
from Pol. and EN are M.K.s). The passage elucidates that Plato holds citizens
to be quite unequal in these two respects. Political power should be allotted
in proportion to the unequal amount of virtue and education citizens actually
have. This is in line with his earlier mention of seven opposing “claims” (axiô-
mata) used to justify ruling. There Plato pronounces that the “most important
claim” is the one according to which “the ignorant man should follow the lead-
ership of the wise and obey his orders” (Leg. III 690d; Plato 1997, p. 1379). Plato’s
distributive principle for political offices is “To each in proportion to his virtue
and education”. This principle implies that it is just to allot equal shares only
to equally virtuous and educated citizens, not to everyone.
Plato’s theory of political justice is embodied in the “political system” (poli-
teia) he outlines in the Laws. Despite his clear preference for proportional or geo-
metrical justice, he argues for a mixture of the two forms of equality and a mixed
constitution. However, like the political system Plato outlined in the Republic,
the one of the Laws has a strong aristocratic character that makes sure that
all important political offices are distributed to the morally and intellectually
best citizens (cf. Knoll 2017a). Plato’s mixed constitution includes the equality
of “measures, weights and numbers” only for reasons of the stability of the po-
litical community. About the mixture of the two forms of equality, he declares,
“So though force of circumstances compels us to employ both sorts of equality,
we should employ the second […] as little as possible” (Leg.VI 757e; Plato 1997,
p. 1433). Plato’s political concession to the champions of democracy does not
mean, however, that egalitarian justice is in general logically consistent with
proportional justice. Egalitarianism and proportionalism manifest not only op-
posing but irreconcilable moral convictions about political justice. Before sub-
stantiating this thesis, it seems natural to include Aristotle’s political theory of
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distributive justice in the discussion, because Aristotle further develops and
clarifies Plato’s theory of two forms of equality and justice.
Aristotle’s political theory of merit has already been extensively treated in
the introduction to this volume. Therefore, here it suffices to focus on his report
and analysis of disagreements on political justice and political systems. In the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies a just distribution of political power
with a distribution “according to merit” (kat’ axian) (EN V 6, 1131a24–26). How-
ever, citizens with different political convictions substantially disagree with
each other on how to measure merit. The democrats favor “freedom” as the ap-
propriate criterion of merit, the supporters of oligarchy “wealth”, the aristocrats
“virtue” (arête), and an unnamed fourth group “noble birth” (EN V 6,
1131a27–29). In the Nicomachean Ethics, like later in the Politics, Aristotle distin-
guishes between four different conceptions of distributive justice: the democrat-
ic, the oligarchic and the aristocratic conception, and an undesignated fourth
conception. Each of these conceptions is linked with its corresponding political
system and justifies its specific distribution of political power. To argue that
every free-born male citizen should get an equal share in political power is iden-
tical with the defense of democracy. To advocate the distribution of political of-
fices in proportion to wealth is the same as to support oligarchy. To argue that
political power should be given only to virtuous citizens is identical with the de-
fense of aristocracy.⁸ Aristotle shares Plato’s aristocratic political preferences.
The best political system he outlines in Books VII and VIII of the Politics is a
true aristocracy and embodies the aristocratic conception of political justice
(cf. Knoll 2016, pp. 87–94). For Aristotle, the political dispute over the appropri-
ate criterion of merit and the appropriate conception of distributive justice is, in
the end, a quarrel over the appropriate political system.
This result of Aristotle’s analysis is not only theoretically relevant. Rather,
the close link between disagreements on political justice and disagreements
on political systems elucidates the huge practical and political significance of
his analysis. The reason for this is that such kinds of disagreements can lead
to seditions, revolutions and civil wars. Therefore, it is not surprising that “up-
heaval” or “revolution” (stasis) is the topic of Book V of the Politics. In Book V,
Aristotle argues that the general motive for sedition or political revolution is that
citizens are outraged and get angry when they perceive the distribution of polit-
 The “distribution of honors according to virtue (kat’ aretên) seems to be the most character-
istic trait of aristocracy; for virtue is the defining criterion of aristocracy, as wealth is the crite-
rion for oligarchy, and free birth of democracy” (Pol. IV 8, 1294a9– 11). For a reconstruction of
the different arguments of the supporters of the four different conceptions of distributive justice
see the introduction to this volume.
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ical power to be unjust, and therefore want to change the political system of
their polis or state.⁹ For Aristotle, the disagreements between, say, supporters
of an oligarchic conception of justice and oligarchy and champions of a demo-
cratic conception and democracy are a form of deep disagreements. It is not pos-
sible to convince either group through the use of reasons and arguments. This is
also demonstrated by the many bloody upheavals and civil wars that happened
after and during the horrific Peloponnesian War, in which Athens endorsed the
democratic and Sparta the anti-democratic or oligarchic forces (cf. Thukydides III
82; Gehrke 1985). If Aristotle’s analysis of deep disagreements on political justice
and their inextricable link to deep disagreements on political systems is correct,
he developed a political theory that does not only allow us to better understand
several of the political revolutions that happened throughout history but also
several of the political conflicts that keep happening in contemporary political
systems.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle interprets a just distribution of political
power in general as a distribution “according to merit”. For him, the source of
disagreements on political justice is not this principle but the four opposing in-
terpretations of merit. In the Politics, however, he opposes “numeric” or “arith-
metic” (gar arithmô) equality like Plato to equality “according to merit” (kat’
axian) (V 1, 1301b29 f.; VI 2, 1317b4; cf. Plato, Leg., VI 751d).¹⁰ This opposition
equals to the fundamental antagonism between arithmetic and proportional
equality and justice. Proportional justice, which applies proportional equality,
and egalitarian justice, which implements arithmetic equality, are not only oppo-
sites but are in general logically irreconcilable. They mutually exclude each other
and represent two competing and contradictory understandings of justice that
are connected to different sets of rules. This means that they cannot both be ap-
plied to solve the same distribution problem without nullifying each other (cf.
Herwig 1984, pp. 97–99). Either justice is equality only for equals or (in an exclu-
sive sense) for all (equals and unequals). The formal principle of proportional
justice determines that only equals should get equal shares, while unequals
should be allotted unequal shares. This formal principle is only in one case rec-
 Ronald Polansky points out: “Since the disposition fostering change or sedition is ultimately
the sense of injustice in distribution in the community, this must be the most general of all the
causes operative in change” (Polansky 1991, p. 335). The main anthropological basis of Aristo-
tle’s theory of political revolutions is the human sense of justice (Pol. I 2, 1253a15– 18; cf.
Knoll 2016, p. 75 f.).
 For Aristotle, “absolute justice” (haplos dikaion) is “according to merit” (Pol.V 1, 1301b35 f.).
For his preferences for an aristocratic conception of distributive justice and for a true aristocracy
see the introduction to this volume and Knoll 2017b.
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oncilable with the formal principle of egalitarian justice that determines that all
should get equal shares: in the case that everyone is equal. If in a distribution of
political power there are unequal citizens like rich and poor ones, an oligarchic
conception of proportional justice requires allotting unequal shares to them in
proportion to their unequal wealth. For oligarchic justice, to distribute equal
shares in such a case would be unjust.¹¹ From the perspective of democratic jus-
tice, however, a distribution of unequal shares is unjust. Democratic justice,
which is egalitarian justice, requires allotting equal shares to every citizen,
which can be achieved through a universal and equal suffrage. Census suffrage,
which is based on oligarchic justice, is unjust from the prevailing modern per-
spective of egalitarian justice. It is noteworthy that after the French Revolution,
which had equality, liberty and fraternity written on its banner, still two out of
three draft constitutions (1791 and 1795) excluded the poor male citizens from
the right to vote for the National Assembly. For elections to the Prussian state
parliament census suffrage, the three-class franchise, was reestablished after
the revolution 1848/49 and stayed valid until 1918.
2.2 The rise of egalitarian justice in modernity and the
opposition of the champions of proportional justice
The vast majority of French citizens in the 18th century perceived the distribution
of social goods and privileges in the ancient régime to be unjust. This was cer-
tainly one of the reasons for the French Revolution. This revolution was an im-
portant breakthrough for the rise of egalitarian justice. Since 1789, an increasing
struggle for different forms of equality has become a central feature of modern-
ity. According to an early egalitarian conception, social and political justice is
achieved when everyone gets allotted equal rights. This idea goes back to the an-
cient conception of democratic justice, to some sophists, to the stoics, and to the
Christian idea that all souls are equal in the eyes of God.¹² In the ancient world,
 If there were virtuous and non-virtuous citizens who had claims in the same distribution, to
distribute equal shares would also be unjust from the perspective of an aristocratic conception
of justice. Aristocratic justice requires allotting unequal shares to citizens in proportion to their
unequal virtue. However, if the most virtuous citizens were poor, such a distribution would be
unjust from the perspective of oligarchic justice.
 In a remarkable passage, Friedrich Nietzsche, a fierce opponent of the rise of egalitarian jus-
tice, pronounces, “The poisonous doctrine ‘equal rights for everyone’ – Christianity disseminat-
ed this the most thoroughly”. For Nietzsche, the French Revolution and other revolutions go
back to the egalitarian “belief in the ‘privileges of the majority’” and thus to “Christian value
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egalitarian justice primarily justified the claim for equal political participation of
all male citizens. In the modern world, egalitarians call not only for an equal
right to participate in the political life for all adult citizens but especially for
equal civil and human rights. The egalitarian claim that everyone should have
equal rights and liberties is also expressed by John Rawls’s first principle of jus-
tice (Rawls 1971, p. 302).
Such egalitarian claims, however, have been opposed by several 19th-cen-
tury philosophers. In his conception of social and political justice, Friedrich
Nietzsche draws on the non-egalitarian or proportionalist views of Plato and Ar-
istotle, claiming that a just distribution must allot goods in proportion to existing
inequalities and allot equal shares only to equals, not to everyone:
The doctrine of equality! … But no poison is more poisonous than this: because it seems as
if justice itself is preaching here, while in fact it is the end of justice … ‘Equality for the
equal, inequality for the unequal’ – that is what justice would really say: along with its cor-
ollary, ‘never make the unequal equal’ (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes § 48, Nietzsche
2005, p. 221 f.).
Like Plato and Aristotle, Nietzsche is convinced that people are not only funda-
mentally unequal but also extremely different in worth and rank. Therefore they
should not be allotted equal but unequal rights. Persons with higher value de-
serve prerogatives and privileges. This is the reason why Nietzsche often contem-
plates rank orders and the appropriate criteria for establishing them. Similar to
how Plato and Aristotle conceive the close relationship between political justice
and the polis, Nietzsche’s conception of proportional justice is embodied in his
notion of a well-ordered state or society (cf. Knoll 2017c). Concerning political
justice, like Plato and Aristotle, John Stuart Mill defends proportionalism by ad-
vocating a distribution of unequal voting rights according to people’s unequal
“value” and “worth” of their opinions to be measured by their unequal virtue,
intelligence and knowledge (2001, chap. 8, pp. 163, 169 f.).
Before 1789, most of the favored positions in French society were distributed
based on aristocratic privileges and thus on noble birth and inheritance. One slo-
gan the revolutionaries used to oppose the ancient régime demanded “The career
open to talents”. The demand for equal opportunity¹³ was at least ideally a de-
mand for equal chances for all talents. However, this claim for egalitarian justice
judgments these revolutions are translating into blood and crimes!” (The Anti-Christ § 43;
Nietzsche 2005, p. 40).
 The demand that careers should be open to talents and that equal talents should have equal
opportunities goes as far back as to the meritocracy Plato outlines in his Republic (cf. III,
415b–c).
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was connected to claims and demands for proportional justice. The favored
positions should not be distributed to all applicants but in proportion to individ-
ual merit or desert. An applicant deserves a position if he or she possesses cer-
tain qualities that allow us to anticipate “a future performance in which that
quality is displayed” (Miller 2003, p. 137). This way of distributing the favored po-
sitions is the modern version of Plato’s and Aristotle’s claims that the political
offices should be allotted “according to merit” (kat’ axian). For Plato and Aristo-
tle, the main reward for performing well in political offices was the “honor” or
“recognition” (timê) the officeholders received from their fellow citizens (cf.
Pol. III 10, 1281a31). In the modern world, the performance principle justifies
high wages for talented and well-trained persons who perform well in their
jobs. Such persons deserve not only a high wage but also recognition in propor-
tion to their contributions to society. In distributing rewards, the performance
principle applies proportional justice and gives to each according to his or her
contribution. If two persons produce equivalent performances, then they deserve
the same rewards. If a third person performs significantly better than those two,
she deserves a higher reward in proportion to her better performance.
Connected to the rise of egalitarian justice, in the last years of the 18th cen-
tury a different and distinctively modern principle of distributive justice ap-
peared on the political stage. It was either the radical egalitarian “Gracchus” Ba-
beuf, the leader of a failed coup attempt against the Directory in 1796, or Johann
Gottlieb Fichte who “first explicitly proclaimed that justice requires the state to
redistribute goods to the poor” (Fleischacker 2004, pp. 76, 160 f.). According to
Babeuf, every man has received from nature “an equal right to enjoy all the
goods” and the “aim of society is to defend this equality” (in Birchall 1997,
p. 166; italics M.K.). In Western history, this was the “first definitive expression”
of the “notion of distributive justice” in the modern sense (Fleischacker 2004,
p. 55). The modern notion of distributive justice is inextricably linked to the wel-
fare state and to the principle of a distribution of goods according to need (cf. the
introduction to this volume). This latter principle, which is the distributive prin-
ciple of the welfare state, can be applied in society jointly with the merit princi-
ple: “A society can give people what they deserve but also set resources aside to
cater to needs” (Miller 2003, p. 155). This combination of principles is realized, at
least to some extent or in imperfect form, in most modern welfare states.
Today, a society that distributes both rewards according to merit and some
basic goods according to need is often welcomed as a just society (cf. Miller
2003, pp. 93, 200 f., 245). However, this contemporary conviction about social jus-
tice was firmly opposed by Karl Marx. In his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program,
Marx claims that in “a higher phase of communist society” labor duties and so-
cial wealth would be distributed by applying the principle “From each according
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to his ability, to each according to his needs!” (Marx 2009, p. 11). In the literature,
it is a controversial issue as to whether Marx’s principle has to be interpreted as
his principle of distributive justice (cf. Geras 1989; Rawls 2007, pp. 335–372). For
the purposes of this article it is not necessary to meddle in this debate and to em-
bark on an extensive Marx-exegesis. It is enough to note that there are good rea-
sons to understand Marx’s principle as a principle of distributive justice. After
introducing his principle and after expounding the considerations that lead
him to postulate it, Marx declares that he now dealt enough with the issue of
a “‘fair distribution’” (gerechte Verteilung) (Marx 2009, p. 11). That Marx’s princi-
ple is essentially a principle of distributive justice is also demonstrated by the
fact that contemporary political philosophers treat the “needs principle”¹⁴ as
such. In his theory of distribute justice, Michael Walzer defends the claim that
basic social goods like security, health care or, more generally, welfare should
be allotted in proportion to “socially recognized needs” (1983, pp. 25 f.,
64–94). This principle is not an egalitarian principle because it aims at propor-
tional equality and therefore allows for justified inequalities. Like Walzer, David
Miller outlines a pluralistic theory of distributive justice that recognizes need,
desert, and equality as principles and “criteria of social justice” (2003, pp. 41,
93, 245).
In his Critique of the Gotha Program, the draft program of the United Work-
ers’ Party of Germany, Marx distinguishes two phases of communist society. De-
spite the fact that in the earlier period social privileges and class differences are
abolished, it is “still stamped with the birthmarks” of the capitalist society from
which it emerges (2009, p. 8). In this socialist period every working individual
receives – after indispensable deductions – back from society “means of con-
sumption” exactly in proportion to her contribution measured by her “individual
quantum of labor” (2009, p. 8 f.). Like the exchange of commodities in capitalist
society, it is an “exchange of equal values”. For Marx, such a socialist organiza-
tion of society has several inevitable “defects” and is “stigmatized by a bour-
geois limitation” (2009, p. 8 f.). If people are merely measured and rewarded
by the “equal standard” of their labor contribution to society, they will receive
unequal shares of the social wealth. The reason for this is that “one man is supe-
rior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor in the same time,
or can labor for a longer time”. The performance principle “tacitly recognizes un-
equal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privi-
 Norman Geras designates Marx’s whole principle “From each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs!” as the “needs principle” (1989, p. 221). However, it is more appropriate
to apply this designation only to the second part of Marx’s principle: “To each according to his
needs!”
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lege” (2009, p. 9 f.). There is another reason why Marx rejects the performance
principle. A distribution of social wealth in proportion to labor contributions
leads to further inequalities because unequal individuals – “one worker is mar-
ried, another is not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth”
– have unequal needs. This means that a worker who is a bachelor with no fam-
ily will be significantly wealthier than a worker who has large needs due to the
large family she is responsible for (2009, p. 10).
These are the considerations that lead Marx to postulate the principle “From
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” that should regu-
late distributions in the final phase of communist society. This principle uncou-
ples – and this is its crucial point – what individual citizens contribute to society
with their labor and their natural endowments from the distributive claims they
have to the sum-total of the fruits of society’s labor. For Marx, the distribution of
social wealth should be independent from unequal labor contributions and
should be exclusively based on unequal individual needs. It seems likely that Ba-
beuf ’s egalitarian convictions that every man has an equal right to all the goods
and that society has to aim at this equality is the base for Marx’s principle (Birch-
all 1997, pp. 95 f., 166). This principle could mean that in “a higher phase of com-
munist society” in which “all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abun-
dantly” a relatively unproductive worker who has large needs due to her large
family receives significantly more means of consumption from society than a rel-
atively productive worker who is a bachelor with no family (Marx 2009, p. 11).
From the perspective of the performance or merit principle, however, it is ex-
tremely unjust if those persons who contribute more to society receive signifi-
cantly less than those who contribute less. However, Marx does not acknowledge
or approve the “bourgeois” performance principle at all. His own distributive
principle is not only irreconcilable with the performance principle but nullifies
it or, in the case just mentioned, even allows it to be reversed. For Marx, the dis-
tribution of social wealth should be exclusively based on unequal needs. Be-
tween the advocates of the performance or merit principle and Marx exists a
deep disagreement on social justice.
An important modern witness to the irreconcilability of conceptions of social
and political justice is the sociologist and philosopher Max Weber.Weber’s view
on justice is part of his general view that modernity is characterized by an irre-
solvable pluralism and struggle of values. Views similar to Weber’s were pro-
nounced by Isaiah Berlin who holds that the “normal human situation” is that
“ends equally ultimate, equally sacred” and “entire systems of value” “come
into collision without possibility of rational arbitration” (Berlin 2013, p. 94; cf.
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pp. 94–99).¹⁵ For Weber, a distinctive trait of the modern world is the existence
not only of irreconcilable conceptions of the good but of justice.¹⁶ Facing such a
situation, each individual has to make a personal decision about which of the
competing values she wants to choose and cherish. Weber persuasively states
about social justice that,
The implications of the postulate of “justice” cannot be decided unambiguously by any
ethic. Whether one, for example – as would correspond most closely with the views ex-
pressed by Schmoller – owes much to those who achieve much or whether one should de-
mand much from those who accomplish much; whether one should, e.g., in the name of
justice […] accord great opportunities to those with eminent talents or whether on the con-
trary (like Babeuf) one should attempt to equalize the injustice of the unequal distribution
of mental capacities through the rigorous provision that talented persons, whose talent
gives them prestige, must not utilize their better opportunities for their own benefit –
these questions cannot be definitely answered. The ethical problem in most social-political
issues is, however, of this type (Weber 1949, p. 15 f.).
According to Weber, there is no possibility for a rational solution to deep disa-
greements on social and political justice. Though moral philosophers can give
arguments for their conceptions of justice, they cannot deliver an ultimate and
undisputable rational grounding for any of their different normative theories.
For the conflict between opposing values and ends there exists “no (rational
or empirical) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide
us with a decision” (Weber 1949, p. 19; cf. Gölz 1978).
2.3 Contemporary disagreements between supporters
of egalitarian and proportional justice
In today’s world, the performance principle and meritocracy are still advocated
by political philosophers (cf. Miller 2003, pp. 177–202). However, most contem-
porary political theorists are endorsing egalitarian justice. In the tradition of
Babeuf and Marx, contemporary egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and Richard
Arneson claim that a just society has to establish some form of arithmetic or nu-
meric equality like “equality of resources” or “equality of opportunity for wel-
fare” (cf. Cohen 1989). The goal of egalitarian justice is – if this is compatible
 For a critique of Berlin’s value pluralism see Steinvorth in this volume.
 From Weber’s perspective, Rawls’s move to come to terms with the opposing conceptions of
the good by striving for a consensus on a political conception of justice and a just social frame-
work that allows these conception to coexist does not work.
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with upholding other values like liberty – to make people more equal in these
respects. Following Dworkin’s suggestion “that the idea that each person matters
equally is at the heart of all plausible political theories”,Will Kymlicka pronoun-
ces that “each theory shares the same ‘egalitarian plateau’” (Kymlicka 2002, p. 4;
cf. Haus in this volume). However, there are still contemporary political philos-
ophers like John Kekes who publish serious treatises like The Illusions of Egali-
tarianism (2003), which argue Against Liberalism (1997). Going back to Aristotle,
Kekes claims “that the worth of human beings varies with their moral merit” and
that “justice makes the right” to resources “contingent on what their recipients
deserve” (1997, p. 120). Kekes defends proportional justice and deeply disagrees
with the liberal and egalitarian conception of justice. Other philosophers such as
Harry Frankfurt argue that equality is morally irrelevant and propose that we
should rather focus on non-relational standards like distributing a sufficient
amount of goods to everyone (Frankfurt 1988, 2015; cf. Krebs 2000).
John Rawls, whose defense of the welfare state has already been treated at
length in the introduction to this volume, starts off his theory of distributive jus-
tice from a “substantive egalitarian principle of justice which assumes that all
departures from equality have to be morally justified” (Barry 1995, p. 153). In
some crucial aspects, Rawls’s position on social justice comes close to Babeuf ’s
and Marx’s views. Like Marx, he opposes recognizing “unequal individual en-
dowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege” (Marx 2009,
p. 10). Considering this closeness and Rawls’s extensive studies of Marx’s view
on justice, it could even be argued that he appropriates Marx’s view and elabo-
rates it (Rawls 2007, pp. 335–372).¹⁷ As a champion of egalitarian justice, Rawls
negates the natural and social inequalities of people. For him, no one “deserves
his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in soci-
ety”. Rawls’s intuition about social justice is, “Those who have been favored
by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms
that improve the situation of those who have lost out” (1971, § 17, p. 101 f.).
Based on this central intuition, from which he develops his difference principle,
Rawls advocates a strong welfare state that redistributes income and wealth from
the well-off members of society to the least advantaged ones (cf. Knoll 2013). As
already expounded in the introduction to this volume, Rawls rejects a distribu-
tion of primary goods like income and wealth according to merit and advocates,
like Marx, a distribution according to need. However, if it comes to wages, Rawls
allows, in contrast to Marx, inequalities based on efforts and contributions in
 For the claim of a deep disagreement between Marx’s principle of distributive justice and
Rawls’s difference principle see Demir in this volume.
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order to create incentives to work more or more efficiently (1971, §§ 43, 47 f.,
pp. 276 f., 304 f., 309, 312). Rawls’s egalitarian goal is, nevertheless, to make peo-
ple more equal concerning certain primary goods like rights, liberties, opportu-
nities, income, wealth and self-respect.
An opposing conception of social justice and of a just political order has
been introduced by the libertarian Robert Nozick. For his political thought,
like for Rawls’s, individual rights are central. However, he strongly disagrees
with the (im‐)moral core of Rawls’s view. According to Nozick, even if people
might not deserve their natural endowments, they still rightfully own them
and have a justified claim to them (1974, p. 225). Therefore, he strongly disagrees
with Rawls’s conception of social justice that regards people’s “natural talents as
a common asset” and “treats people’s abilities and talents as resources for oth-
ers” (1974, p. 228; cf. pp. 30, 33, 172; cf. Rawls 1971, p. 101). Rawls’s view equals to
introducing “a head tax on assets and abilities” (1974, p. 229). For Nozick, a just
society is not allowed to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor as this
violates people’s rights. Nozick himself develops an “entitlement theory of jus-
tice” that goes back to Locke and the reductionist early modern view that distrib-
utive justice concerns mainly the just appropriation and just transfer of property
(1974, pp. 153, 149– 182; cf. Kersting 2000, pp. 47–53). In a well-known polemic
statement, Nozick, the advocate of a minimal state, objects to Rawls’s ideal of an
extensive welfare state and to the redistributions it requires: “Taxation of earn-
ings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some persons find this claim ob-
viously true: taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the
person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another’s purpose” (1974,
p. 169).
The deep disagreements between Rawls’s and Nozick’s views on social jus-
tice could be interpreted as a resumption of the deep disagreements between ad-
vocates of the performance or merit principle and Marx’s views on social justice.
While Nozick argues for a version of “political individualism” and the perform-
ance principle, Rawls defends “political communalism” and a distribution of
goods that should be primarily based on the needs of the least advantaged citi-
zens.¹⁸ As a non-egalitarian, Nozick has no problem with social inequality and
defends an unequal distribution of wealth and income in proportion to labor
contributions based on unequal natural endowments and efforts. On the contra-
ry, Rawls aims at socially compensating for the natural and social inequalities
 In his contribution to this volume, Ulrich Steinvorth argues for the thesis that we can ration-
ally arbitrate between Rawls’s and Nozick’s conceptions of justice. Steinvorth characterizes
Rawls’s view as “political communalism”. For good reasons he prefers this term to “political
communism”.
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and at establishing the highest possible level of social equality. However, while
Marx calls for a distribution of social wealth independent from labor contribu-
tions, Rawls concedes some unequal rewards and wages based on efforts and
contributions.
3 Reasons for deep disagreements among
notions of social and political justice
The preceding analysis of the history of political thought on distributive justice
demonstrates that deep disagreements among notions of social and political jus-
tice are one of its characteristic features. From antiquity to the present day we
can observe disagreements on values, just distributions and a just society that
cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Perhaps the
only progress in this history is the emergence of the modern notion of distribu-
tive justice that is connected to the welfare state and a distribution of basic goods
according to need (cf. Fleischacker 2004). However, the conflict between egali-
tarian and non-egalitarian or proportional justice cannot be resolved by attribut-
ing the conflicting views to different historical periods and by claiming a “moral
progress” towards egalitarianism (cf. Herwig 1984).¹⁹ As the preceding analysis
demonstrates, the fundamentally opposed two basic conceptions of social and
political justice can be traced both in antiquity and in modernity.
There are good reasons to suppose with Aristotle and Rawls that all human
beings possess a “sense of justice” (Pol. I 2, 1253a14– 18; Rawls 1971, § 4, § 39,
§ 77; pp. 19, 243, 505). Small children somehow notice when they or others are
treated unjustly. However, as adults opposing intuitions of what constitutes a
just distribution and a just political order are formed. As a first and preliminary
step toward a better understanding of such disagreements, this section sketches
five possible reasons that can explain them. This sketch and the exact relation-
ship between these reasons have to be elaborated through detailed analyses in
future research.
(1) For Hampshire, moral conflict is inevitable because human imagination,
which makes us unique individuals, causes us to develop not only different no-
tions of a good and happy life but different moral outlooks (1983; 1999, pp. 18,
30, 68; cf. Giorgini in this volume).
 For arguments against a Hegelian historical or evolutionary solution of disagreements see
Ribeiro 2011, pp. 18–21.
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(2) In Spheres of Justice,Walzer bases his theory of justice on the meanings of
social goods in particular societies (1983). From this perspective, disagreement
can be explained by the fact that several different interpretations of these mean-
ings are possible and justifiable (Warnke 1993).²⁰
(3) A classical approach to explaining disagreements on justice can be found
in the Marxist tradition. From this perspective, justice is based on class interest.
Philosophical disagreements regarding just distributions and just political orders
can be understood by tracing them back to the social or economic position of the
theoretician. For Marx, the “economic structure of society” is “the real founda-
tion” “on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which corre-
spond definite forms of social consciousness”. It is human’s “social existence
that determines their consciousness” (1987, p. 263). According to Marx’s view,
a conception of justice generalizes a particular social position or expresses the
particular interest of one social class. The position of the less favored social
classes suggests an egalitarian view according to which it is just to establish a
good deal of social equality and to redistribute the income of the privileged
classes. On the contrary, the social position and interest of the privileged classes
prompt a non-egalitarian view that conceives of a just distribution of social
goods as one in proportion to existing inequalities. This approach to explaining
the disagreements on social and political justice assumes that moral judgments
on justice are not an independent phenomenon but can be reduced to objective
interests that go along with different social positions. An argument for this ap-
proach is that it takes into account human egoism. Rawls had good reasons to
situate the parties who decide on principles of justice “behind a veil of igno-
rance” (1971, § 24, p. 136). Such an information deficit about one’s own social po-
sition and natural endowments prevents people from making choices in their
personal interest and is intended to lead to impartial decisions. However, it
can be shown empirically – consider Marx, Engels and most members of the
Frankfurt School – that not all theoreticians advocate their “objective class inter-
ests”.
(4) A fourth approach to explaining disagreements on justice could be called
a cognitive approach. This approach can be illustrated by an important change in
Rawls’s view. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls defends a Kantian understanding of
reason as a general or universal faculty. For him, the parties who decide about
principles of justice in the initial situation of equality are “similar rational and
similarly situated”, and therefore “each is convinced by the same arguments”
(1971, § 25, p. 139). On the contrary, in Political Liberalism, Rawls concedes “dif-
 Cf. footnote 5 of this article.
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ficulties in arriving at agreement in judgment” or the reality of “reasonable dis-
agreement” which is “disagreement between reasonable persons” (2005, II § 2,
pp. 55, 58). Now Rawls acknowledges as a “general fact” of “the political culture
of a democratic society” that “many of our most important judgments are made
under conditions where it is not expected that conscientious persons with full
powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at the same conclu-
sion” (2005, I § 6, p. 36; II § 2, p. 58). Rawls denotes the causes or sources of rea-
sonable disagreements as “the burdens of judgment”²¹ and presents an open list:
Evidence is difficult to evaluate, the overall weight of the manifold relevant (nor-
mative) considerations on both sides of an issue is hard to assess, our concepts
are vague and therefore we must rely on interpretations and judgments about in-
terpretations, our moral and political judgments are shaped by our disparate life
experiences, it is difficult to select among our moral and political values and to
prioritize them (2005, II § 2, pp. 55–57). Generally speaking, “Different concep-
tions of the world can reasonably be elaborated from different standpoints
and diversity arises in part from our distinct perspectives” (2005, II § 2, p. 58).
With his burdens-of-judgment argument Rawls wants to explain the modern plu-
ralism of “reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doc-
trines” (2005, I § 6, p. 36; II § 3, pp. 54 f., 60).²² There is evidence for “attributing
to Rawls the belief that issues of justice are not subject to the burdens of judg-
ment” (Waldron 1999, p. 152). However, this exemption cannot be justified. The
burdens of judgment can also be “used to characterize our political delibera-
tions, including our deliberations about rights and justice, as well as ethics, re-
ligion, etc.” (Waldron 1999, p. 112). The burdens of judgment can partly explain
our deep disagreements on social and political justice. By admitting “reasonable
disagreements”, Rawls unintentionally undermines his ideas of an overlapping
consensus on a political conception of justice and of a possible agreement on
principles of social justice (cf. Waldron 1999, p. 151 f.; for a realist notion of rea-
sonableness see Wolthuis in this volume).
The cognitive approach to explaining the causes of disagreements on justice
can and should, of course, be pursued beyond Rawls’s discussion of the burdens
of justice. This approach points toward a broader investigation of human reason.
 For the burdens of judgment see also Peter Caven’s and Michal Rupniewski’s contributions
to this volume.
 “The evident consequence of the burdens of judgment is that reasonable persons do not all
affirm the same comprehensive doctrine” (2005, II § 3, p. 60). Rawls also declares, “These bur-
dens of judgment are of first significance for a democratic idea of tolerance” (2005, II § 2, p. 58;
cf. Introduction, p. XXIVf.). An understanding of the sources or causes of the modern pluralism
of comprehensive doctrines should make it easier to tolerate the doctrines one disapproves.
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Why do philosophers constantly disagree with each other? Why are they only
rarely convinced by each other’s arguments? Considering that “philosophy is
the business of disagreement”, it is “very surprising” that until today philosophy
has not “worked out a fairly sophisticated account of disagreement” (Ribeiro
2011, p. 3). In the terminology of Jean-François Lyotard’s The Differend, there ex-
ists a conflict or “differend” (différend) between egalitarian and non-egalitarian
conceptions of social and political justice (1988). For Lyotard, like other con-
flicts, this one cannot be decided because there is no rule for a judgment that
can be applied to both conceptions. Highly relevant for future research on the
cognitive causes for disagreements are also the contemporary debates on deep
and peer disagreements (Fogelin 2005, Siegel 2013).
(5) A fifth approach to explaining disagreements on conceptions of justice
focuses on the opposing images of humanity connected to them. According to
this approach, disagreements on justice can be explained by a clash of the un-
derlying conceptions of man. In the language of Fogelin’s Logic of Deep Disagree-
ments, the conflicting convictions that humans are either equal or (in an exclu-
sive sense) unequal, or rather that either the one or the other matters, are the
“underlying principles” or “framework propositions” that can surface as the rea-
sons that create the disagreements on justice (2005, p. 8).²³ For non-egalitarians
like Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche, human beings are fundamentally unequal
and have unequal value. On the contrary, for egalitarians all human beings
have equal worth, and are therefore equally worthy of concern and respect.
For Plato, people can be as different as reason, the highest part of the soul,
and the appetites, the lowest part of the soul. For Aristotle, person’s different
human value corresponds to the degree in which they have perfected their eth-
ical virtues, their character, and their practical and theoretical reason. Based on
people’s different worth and rank, for Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche it is just to
distribute equal shares only to equals, not to everyone. On the contrary, based on
their conviction of human equality, egalitarians aim at establishing more equal-
 One of Fogelin’s examples for deep disagreements is the abortion debate: “Parties on oppo-
site sides of the debate can agree on a wide range of biological facts” and also “on the sanctity of
human life” (2005, p. 8). However, “the central issue of the abortion debate is the moral status of
the fetus”, and in regard to this issue the one party believes that at conception or shortly after-
wards “an immortal soul enters into the fertilized egg” and the other party does not. There is no
way of solving such a disagreement through the use of reasons and arguments because of the
irreconcilable belief systems that the disagreement is based on (2005, p. 8 f.). For a critique of
Fogelin’s “Wittgensteinian view” of the “limits of reason” see Siegel 2013, pp. 16–21; cf. Ribeiro
2011, pp. 7–9.
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ity among persons.²⁴ For non-egalitarians, just distributions should correspond
to natural inequalities, for modern egalitarians they should move beyond such
inequalities towards more equality (cf. Herwig 1984, p. 202). If deep disagree-
ments on just distributions and just political orders can be explained primarily
through disagreements about the equality or inequality of human beings, future
research has to examine the reasons for deep disagreements about human na-
ture.
4 The meta-ethical relevance of deep
disagreements among notions of social
and political justice
The linguistic turn in the philosophy of the 20th century lead to a new branch of
moral philosophy called meta-ethics. This new discipline does not defend any
normative principles or ethical theories but investigates the nature of morality
and the meaning of moral statements and judgments. What do we mean when
we claim that something is right, good or just? Are we referring to moral facts
and moral truth or do we just express our personal, or our society’s, feelings,
thoughts, and attitudes? Meta-ethics analyzes more than just moral language
and arguments; it also analyses the ontological and epistemological questions
connected to them. “Ethical realists” claim that moral statements and judgments
refer to moral facts or an objective moral reality, anti-realists (called moral skep-
tics, ethical relativists or ethical subjectivists) deny this. “Cognitivists” maintain
that moral judgments can be true or false and that there is such a thing as moral
knowledge. “Non-cognitivists” reject the idea that moral knowledge is possible.
The preceding demonstration that deep disagreements among notions of so-
cial and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political
thought is significant for meta-ethics. The reason for this is that the existence
of such deep disagreements is a strong argument against ethical realism and cog-
nitivism. More than two thousand years of intense philosophical research on jus-
tice – our central moral, social and political virtue – has neither uncovered ob-
jective truth about the matter nor led to any agreement among scholars. Looking
at it the other way round, deep disagreements among notions of social and po-
litical justice exist because there are no objective moral reality and no moral
 Cf. Sommer 2016, pp. 42 f., 66 f. For a more detailed account of the opposing images of hu-
manity see the introduction to this volume.
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facts. There is nothing in the world to back up one of the conflicting philosoph-
ical views on justice and no procedure using moral facts to solve moral disagree-
ments and to show that one view is wrong and one is right. If the argument
against moral realism from deep disagreements is persuasive, we attain a sixth
reason for explaining deep disagreements among notions of social and political
justice. The philosophical argument that the existence of deep disagreements on
justice refutes ethical realism is similar to the well-known sociological argument
from relativity, which it complements.
Let’s start with some preliminary meta-ethical observations and considera-
tions. If we analyse ordinary moral language and thought, we notice that it usu-
ally contains claims about objective moral facts.We frequently exclaim, “This is
not just!” However, the fact that our moral statements and judgments make
such claims does not prove that moral facts or objective values exist. As John
L. Mackie put it: “The claim to objectivity, however ingrained in our language
and thought, is not self-validating” (1977, p. 35). Despite their claims to objectiv-
ity, our moral statements and judgments could still just express our subjective
moral feelings, thoughts, desires, and attitudes. As Mackie argues, the “sup-
posed objectivity of moral qualities” could arise from “the projection or objecti-
fication of moral attitudes” (1977, p. 42). Just as we tend to read our feelings into
the objects, for example by ascribing a fungus that disgusts us the quality of
foulness, we project our subjective moral feelings, desires, and attitudes into
the world (1977, p. 42). Furthermore, invoking an objective moral reality could
simply have the strategic function to make our subjective judgments appear
stronger and more authoritative. Consider children who say that they really
need something, which just expresses that they really want it. For Mackie,
moral claims pointing to something “objectively descriptive” are “all false”
(1977, p. 35). Mackie supports this “error theory” mainly with “the argument
from relativity and the argument from queerness” and claims that the latter is
more important than the former (1977, pp. 35–42).
The philosophical argument from queerness has an ontological part: “If there
were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” (1977,
p. 38). Examples for such queer entities are Plato’s forms and in particular his
form of the good. Plato was an ethical realist and cognitivist. The argument
from queerness also has an epistemological part. If objective moral facts existed,
it would be very difficult to explain how we could access them: “Corresponding-
ly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing ev-
erything else” (1977, p. 38). In a recent counter to the argument from queerness,
Julian Nida-Rümelin defends an ethical realism that is ontologically agnostic
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(2016, pp. 91– 136). However, this does not leverage out the argument. The ethical
realist who both claims that moral facts exist and that we can somehow access
them has the burden of proof. If we are to accept the belief that objective values
are part of the structure of the world, we should be able to track or comprehend
their nature and their place in this world.²⁵ Likewise, someone who claims an
empirical fact, say, the existence of centaurs, should be able to prove their exis-
tence to the skeptic. If the moral skeptic needs to identify moral facts with an
inaccessible metaphysical or divine reality like the one usually associated with
Plato’s form of the good, she has good reasons to doubt their existence.
The sociological argument from relativity goes back to the sophist Protagoras
who was informed about the variation in customs and moral codes from one cul-
ture to another by the historian Herodotus. From this, Protagoras concluded that
in moral matters there are no universal truths. However, for good reasons he ar-
gued that some moral beliefs are more beneficial than others (Plato: Theaetetus
166e– 167d, 172a/b, 177d/e).²⁶ Today, based on history, anthropology, ethnology,
and sociology, descriptive morality informs us about the wide range of diversity
in moral beliefs. This diversity and the existence of all kinds of moral disagree-
ments – on values, a good life, the common good, politics, abortion, euthanasia,
animal rights, and on and on – are the premises of the argument from relativity.²⁷
This argument claims both that moral diversity and disagreement suggest “that
there are no absolute universal moral standards binding on all men at all times”
and that the validity of moral beliefs and principles depends on their cultural or
even on their individual acceptance²⁸ (Ladd 1985, pp. 1, 3). This argument against
ethical realism “has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral
 For Nida-Rümelin, it is an undeniable normative fact that murder is morally wrong (2016,
pp. 124, 130). To be sure, this is a universally shared moral judgment or belief and there are uni-
versally shared reasons to think that murder is morally wrong. However, in order to substantiate
the view that beyond these judgments, beliefs and reasons there exists such a thing as an ob-
jective moral fact to which they refer would require an additional proof.
 Plato deeply disagreed with Protagoras’s ethical relativism or skepticism. His own theory
that the philosopher can achieve the truth about objective forms of justice and the good that
exist separate from the sensual world is an attempt to refute Protagoras’s view that in these mat-
ters there are no universal truths because justice and moral goodness varies from one culture to
another. Plato’s student Aristotle, however, deeply disagreed with Plato that such forms exist.
 Moral disagreements are embedded in a wider set of religious and philosophical disagree-
ments.
 The position that the validity of moral beliefs and principles depends on their cultural ac-
ceptance is called “conventional ethical relativism”. The more radical position is “subjective eth-
ical relativism” that bases the validity of moral beliefs and principles on the “acceptance by an
individual agent” (Pojman/Fieser 2012, p. 16).
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codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life
than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously in-
adequate and badly distorted, of objective values” (Mackie 1977, p. 37). If moral
truth exists, contradicting norms and values cannot be likewise true. The enor-
mous amount of existing moral diversity and disagreement suggests that no
moral view can be understood as the apprehension of the one objective moral
truth (cf. Birnbacher 2003, p. 391 f.; Waldron 1999, p. 177).
The argument against ethical realism from deep disagreements on justice is
above all a philosophical argument. It is not just an argument concerning ethics
but as well political philosophy.²⁹ This argument is not primarily based on soci-
eties’ or cultures’ disagreements on moral codes or distributions in the political
community but on disagreements among researchers and scholars. Even if we
suppose that philosophers’ judgments about a just distribution or just society
are influenced by their own personal and cultural backgrounds, their disagree-
ments supposedly go deeper and are more rational than “common” people’s
and societies’ disagreements on values and moral codes. Philosopher’s views
are not only based on their “considered judgments”³⁰ on justice but on elaborat-
ed theories that they defend with carefully constructed arguments. According to
an old-fashioned view, philosophy is committed to finding out the truth. Howev-
er, after more than two thousand years of continuous philosophical disagree-
ments on social and political justice, it is very likely that no objective truth
about justice exists. Considering the enormous amount of past philosophical ef-
forts, there is no reason for optimism that the lack of consensus could change in
the future (cf. Ribeiro 2011, pp. 18–21).
Of course, the mere fact of continuous deep disagreements on justice does
not conclusively rule out the possibility that an objective moral reality or
moral truth exists. Hypothetically, supporters of proportional justice like Plato
could have been able to perceive the truth and all egalitarians could have distort-
ed or false views on justice or vice versa. However, the burden-of-proof argument
also applies to these cases. Neither Plato nor other moral realists were able to
demonstrate the existence of an objective moral reality. Similarly, as Waldron
puts it, “moral disagreement remains a continuing difficulty for realism, even
 For Aristotle, justice is a moral or ethical virtue that is also applied in arguments about po-
litical distributions (cf. Knoll 2016). Similarly, for Rawls and other contemporary philosophers,
political philosophy is applied moral philosophy. There are good reasons for this view and for
understanding justice claims as moral claims.
 Rawls defines “considered judgments” as those “judgments in which our moral capacities
are most likely to be displayed without distortion”. They are “rendered under conditions favor-
able to the exercise of the sense of justice” (Rawls 1971, § 9, p. 47).
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it does not entail its falsity, so long as the realist fails to establish connections
between the idea of objective truth and the existence of procedures for resolving
disagreement” (1999, p. 177). In mainstream sciences, practitioners disagree with
each other, say, about aspects of climate change, but there is some agreement on
the methods and procedures how to settle or resolve such disagreements. How-
ever, “nothing remotely comparable” exists among moralists or moral philoso-
phers (Waldron 1999, p. 178). Waldron’s argument from the lack of consensus
on how to solve moral disagreements is connected to the burden-of-proof argu-
ment. Both arguments are part of the philosophical argument against moral re-
alism from deep disagreements. Combined with the arguments from queerness
and from relativity, this results in a very strong case against moral realism and
cognitivism.³¹
5 Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that deep disagreements among notions of social
and political justice are a characteristic feature of the history of political thought.
Despite the fact that today there is much more consensus on democracy than a
hundred years ago, disagreements on political justice linger on (cf. Knoll/Şimşek
in this volume). This article has also shown that the fact of deep disagreements
on justice yields important arguments for the case of the moral skeptic or ethical
relativist against the moral realist and cognitivist. Considering that deep disa-
greements among notions of social and political justice concern both ethics
and political philosophy, it would be most appropriate to denote the position
defended here as ethico-political relativism or ethico-political skepticism (for
the relation of disagreements to relativism and skepticism see Ribeiro 2011,
pp. 9– 11).
This article has only sketched six reasons that explain deep disagreements
among notions of social and political justice. Future research needs to elaborate
on this sketch and analyze the exact relationship between these reasons. Equally
important is the question of how to cope with deep disagreements on justice.
Considering that such disagreements can lead to violent conflicts and civil
wars, this task is of serious practical and political relevance. Conventional eth-
ical relativists often claim that their theory supports the value of tolerance (cf.
 Ronald Dworkin claims “that there is often a single right answer to complex questions of law
and political morality” and rejects the “no-right-answer” thesis (1978, p. 279f.). However, the ar-
gument from deep disagreements on social and political justice demonstrates that Dworkin’s
view cannot be upheld.
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Pojman/Fieser 2012, p. 20 f.). However, deep disagreements on justice lead rather
to enmity among the supporters of egalitarianism and proportionalism. The
least we can ask for is that the opposed parties of such conflicts respect the
fact that reasonable disagreements on justice exist. This means that they should
not oversimplify the matter by degrading the opponent as ignorant, backward,
prejudiced, unintelligent, and such like (cf. Waldron 1999, p. 111; Ribeiro 2011,
pp. 7– 11).³²
To be sure, many actual political conflicts are caused or can be derived from
disagreements on social and political justice. This is especially true when firm
moral and political convictions are involved as it is the case in quarrels between
liberals and conservatives, generally speaking, between the political “left” and
“right”. Considering that justice is the most important moral, social, and politi-
cal virtue, it is even possible to define these terms based on the corresponding
egalitarian or non-egalitarian convictions about social and political justice. Sim-
ilar ideas have been expressed by Noberto Bobbio in his small study Left and
Right (1997). According to Bobbio, the political convictions of the “left” and
“right” are not only connected to egalitarian or non-egalitarian views of justice,
but to opposing images of humanity that go along with them (cf. section 3 of this
article). The hypothesis that followers of German political parties on the left
share egalitarian views and adherents of German political parties on the right
non-egalitarian views, has been successfully verified applying empirical research
(Fichtner 2012).
Disagreement has become a new research interest among scholars with dif-
ferent backgrounds. Deep disagreements exist not only among notions of social
and political justice and among ethicists, but among philosophers in general (Ri-
beiro 2011). There are new controversies on deep and peer disagreements and a
debate on the epistemology of disagreement (cf. Siegel 2013). Political scientists
engage in conflict research and we certainly see a lot of political and moral dis-
agreement in domestic politics and international relations. It would be desirable,
if future research focused more on the various commonalities and connections of
the different forms of disagreement.
 According to Waldron, respecting disagreement “need not involve rejecting the premise
about the singularity of truth; that is, it need not involve anything like relativism. Respect has
to do with how we treat each other’s beliefs about justice in circumstances where none of
them is self-certifying, not how we treat the truth about justice itself” (1999, p. 111).
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